• FAIR – supporting auto accident victims through advocacy and education
  • FAIR – supporting auto accident victims through advocacy and education
  • FAIR – supporting auto accident victims through advocacy and education
  • FAIR – supporting auto accident victims through advocacy and education

The Independent Insurer Medical Examination IME/IE

‘FAIR – supporting auto accident victims through advocacy and education’


Rules of Civil Procedure 4.1.01  (1)  It is the duty of every expert engaged by or on behalf of a party to provide evidence in relation to a proceeding under these rules,
(a) to provide opinion evidence that is fair, objective and non-partisan;
(b) to provide opinion evidence that is related only to matters that are within the expert’s area of expertise; and
(c) to provide such additional assistance as the court may reasonably require to determine a matter in issue.
Duty Prevails
(2)  The duty in subrule (1) prevails over any obligation owed by the expert to the party by whom or on whose behalf he or she is engaged.

FAIR believes that our government can and should do a better job to ensure that all accident victims are treated fairly so that they have the best possible chance of reaching maximum recovery after an automobile accident.

Ontario’s accident victims are legislated to attend Independent Medical Examinations (IME or IE) when they make an insurance claim. Unlike any other visit to a doctor, claimants have no choice in who their assessor might be, that decision is made by their insurer.

During an IME, vulnerable and injured accident victims are no longer ‘patients’ but are now ‘clients’ to whom the physician owes no ‘duty of care’. Far too often the assessor provides an unqualified, biased or shoddy assessment that becomes part of a claimants’ medical file. Rehabilitation and benefits are often discontinued based on a flawed report and it can take years to have treatment and benefits reinstated.

Worse yet, our government now intends to fine claimants $500 for failing to appear at an assessment when ordered to do so. Accident victims should be very concerned when attending these assessments when there is no real and reliable oversight, no way of knowing whether that assessor has a multitude of complaints about the quality of their work that their College has kept secret and out of sight. A recent search of the FSCO Arbitration Unit Decisions found that the Arbitrators have described what they are asked to accept as ‘evidence’ as “inaccurate, failed, misleading, defective, incomplete, deficient, not correct and flawed” in only two of the more recent Decisions.

How is the vulnerable and sometimes brain-injured accident victim supposed to ferret out the information on secret College censures that have kept the public in the dark about the quality of the medical services provided to Ontarians? Are accident victims supposed to call the FSCO for passwords so that their Decisions are accessible for reading? Adverse comments about IME vendors are deeply buried in Decisions few accident victims ever read. So the accident victim is kept in the dark about the qualifications of the IME assessors and must attend at his/her own risk. For this reason alone, Ontario’s MVA victims shouldn’t attend assessments without a family member or friend to accompany them to keep notes and records.

This has worked out well for Ontario’s insurance industry and for those for-hire physicians who provide insurers with the medical reports used to decide whether or not an injured claimant is entitled to treatment and benefits. The lack of accountability has allowed a small group of pro-insurer physicians and assessors to operate without fear of consequences while providing insurers and our courts with flawed and substandard IME reports. Reports that are then used to disqualify legitimately injured auto accident victims.

Seriously injured claimants will never get fair treatment unless/until the quality of insurer assessments (IMEs) denying them policy benefits (including treatment benefits) finally improves.

Poor quality insurer assessments have been an enduring problem for Ontario auto accident victims. Some of the medical assessors and medical authorities who have been the key architects of our insurance compensation system have the opinion that many injured claimants exaggerate their impairments for opportunistic gain.

Some of these ‘experts’ have been sketchy characters. For example, when No-Fault insurance was first adopted, for several years Dr. James N. Sears http://www.torontosun.com/news/torontoandgta/2008/12/31/7891486.html passed himself off as the Ontario “medical authority” on opportunistic fraud in the auto insurance casualty context. Dr. Sears wrote many articles denigrating injured Ontario auto accident claimants by painting them as “fraudsters”. But as it turned out – the auto insurers’ “medical authority” on fraud, Dr. Sears, wasn’t even a licensed physician. His licence to practice medicine had been revoked a year before he became the industry’s most prolific “medical authority” on medical fraud. But Dr. Sears set a standard of claimant bashing and abuse that became acceptable and it continues to this day. Some physicians whose sole source of income is through insurer sponsored IMEs have, through their reports, disqualified many thousands of legitimate and vulnerable accident victims.

Sure, there are good and bad assessors, but that is the problem in a nutshell. Shouldn’t ALL IME reports be accurate when the quality of life for our most vulnerable citizens lays in the balance?

So FAIR will instead be looking to more credible voices. We will be looking to the impartial Judges and Arbitrators to see what they have had to say on the topic of the quality of the IME product in Ontario. Surely we can trust the Judges and triers of fact. They speak to us through their Decisions and so we will look to those Decisions and provide their commentary aimed at the assessments they wade through on a daily basis as they adjudicate cases.

FAIR believes all ‘rogue’ assessors ought to be purged from the system – whether providing (on a fee for service basis) substandard, unqualified or flawed assessments to insurers – or to plaintiff lawyers – or to both.

FAIR believes that any assessor who has been the subject of repeated adverse judicial commentary due to unqualified, incomplete, or shoddy assessments – that assessor should be barred from participating in the system (a suggestion made in a recent Toronto Sun column).“If a judge or arbitrator has made critical or adverse comments concerning a health professional make the comments public rather than leave them buried in decisions that few read. Allow adverse comments made about a health professional to be used against the health professional in subsequent cases and disallow the use of any professional who has been the subject of three adverse comments. We can get rid of shoddy, biased independent medical examinations — but only if we want to.”     (http://www.torontosun.com/2012/11/30/concern-for-professional-reps) Saturday December 01, 2012.

In the interests of ending the practice of tolerating substandard IMEs/IEs, here are links to cases with quotes from the triers of fact that speak to the quality of these (IME/IE) assessments. We’ve posted the links to columns and articles related to the decisions at the bottom of the excerpts.



17-001337 v. Coachman Insurance Company, 2018 CanLII 139515 (ON LAT)

17-001337 v. Coachman Insurance Company, 2018 CanLII 139515 (ON LAT), <http://canlii.ca/t/hzm7j

[45]        West Park Assessment Centre conducted a catastrophic evaluation for Coachman in 2016, and addendums in 2017. Coachman called the team’s psychologist and orthopaedic surgeon, and relied on the reports of the Occupational Therapist.

[46]        Dr. David Prendergast conducted a psychology IE on July 20, 2016, and issued a report dated October 12, 2016, and a “Material Review” report dated April 21, 2017. His key finding was that “this gentleman was not being entirely straight with me, and I didn’t find any objective evidence of psychological problems.” He concluded that [the applicant] had a 0% WPI rating and a Class 1 (no impairment) under the four domains. There were several noteworthy points to his testimony.

[47]        First, he expressed his evaluation showed (in my words) [the applicant] was dishonest and deliberately exaggeratory, based on several factors: (1) His psychometric testing produced invalid results, with results on the “REY” so low that it’s highly unlikely that his limited education would have been the cause, the MSPQ showed over-reporting physical problems, and on the TOMM Memory Test, which should be free of educational concerns, “His responses were quite extreme. You would have to go out of your way to choose the wrong item in order to do as poorly as he did.” (2) Testing by Drs. Becker and Notofonzo also produced invalid or incomplete results. (3) [the applicant]’s interview did not demonstrate any symptoms that indicate post-traumatic stress disorder, depression or a driving phobia, such as tearfulness, agitation or flashbacks. (4) He maintained a sense of humor, yet displayed a high degree to pain related behavior, walking slow, standing several times to stretch, tense facial expressions, and frequent comments upon his pain.

[48]        Second, during Dr. Prendergast’s testimony, it became clear that he was unaware that two different versions of his report existed, creating an inference that his report had been altered without his knowledge. That discovery came to light during his testimony when he was providing page citations that did not match the version that Coachman had previously circulated and entered into evidence. The copy the doctor brought with him was a 60-page report, dated July 25, 2016 on his own letterhead, yet the report Coachman had disclosed was 44-pages, dated October 12, 2016, and on West Park’s letterhead.

[49]        On inquiry, Dr. Prendergast explained that his version was the draft he sent to West Park and the clinical portion would be the same. West Park’s version, he believed, simply included the OT and in-home assessment reports, but yet he would have reviewed those. However, [the applicant]’s counsel’s questioning established that the OT Report was not yet available at the time the draft report was written, at least minor tinkering can be found in the wording, and the focus of his report is somewhat different (Criterion 7 & 8, versus just 8). Still, he maintained, it’s likely he did the editing, but he could not be sure if the editing occurred after his last approval, and he doesn’t recall switching [the applicant]’s name from Mr. R. to Mr. A.R.

[50]        Third, his testimony changed on questioning. At first, he said he was disagreeing “to an extent” with prior assessors that found [the applicant] had diagnoses from the work-related accident, but when pressed during cross-examination, he broadened his opinion to even disagree with prior assessments, including Dr. Notorfonzo’s, despite it being several years earlier. Then on re-examination, he again changed his answer, correctly limiting it to that he can only comment as to the date of his assessment. His waiver back and forth on this point of inherently claiming [the applicant] had fooled so many previous assessors, may simply be due to strong cross-examination, but it weakens his testimony. Ultimately, for balance, he did clarify that while he could not confirm objective evidence of a psychological impairment or distress based on his interview and test data to formally diagnose [the applicant] with a disorder – he did acknowledge [the applicant] could still have distress, a history of pain problems, or limitations.

[69]        Regarding the diagnosis, I find that [the applicant] does have a pain disorder and depression, although possibly not to the full extent that [the applicant] suggests. Thus, I accept Dr. Becker’s conclusion on diagnosis over Dr. Prendergast’s, for several reasons.

                                   a.         [The applicant] has been consistently diagnosed with a pain disorder and/or depression since at least 2008, by numerous assessors, including Coachman’s own, who did so despite “invalid” indicators.

                                   b.         Both psychological assessors agreed that a lack of formal education and cultural and language issues could at least partially explain the poor validity results. Dr. Becker concluded that validity tests were not particularly reliable, and tried to interpret the remaining data. Dr. Prendergast concluded that regardless of educational issues, the results were so extreme, and not supported by other objective evidence, that he concluded that [the applicant] “wasn’t being straight” with him.

                                    c.         While [the applicant] wasn’t entirely “straight” with Dr. Prendergast, Dr. Becker’s approach fit with the overall evidence – [the applicant]’s behavior, other diagnoses (including IE assessor Dr. Notarfonzo’s on “invalid” results).

                                   d.         While I accept some of Dr. Prendergast’s testimony on other points, the altered report and his comment that he disagreed with long-past prior diagnoses, a comment he soon retracted, weakened the strength of his opinion in this matter.

Comments are closed.

Assessor’s medical opinion evidence, libel, and public interest case

2019-11-12 Maia Bent, et al. v. Howard Platnick, et al. (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) 38374 Scheduled for 9:30 a.m. Will be webcast live

More detail re SCC leave to appeal https://www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-regi-eng.aspx?cas=38374


Maia Bent, et al. v. Howard Platnick, et al., 2019 CanLII 35199 (SCC)

Platnick v. Bent, 2018 ONCA 851 (CanLII)

Platnick v. Bent, 2018 ONCA 687 (CanLII)

Platnick v Bent, 2017 ONSC 585 (CanLII)

Platnick v. Bent – Endorsement (1) ONSC 7340 20161201

Platnick v. Bent – Endorsement Re Preliminary Motion (2) ONSC 7474 20161201

Statement of Claim – FILED – 3334-15 – September 3

The original media story: http://www.insurancebusiness.ca/ca/news/auto/medical-files-routinely-altered-to-suit-insurers-claims-fair-186692.aspx?p=1

The latest stories in the media:





Letter to MPPs regarding medical file manipulations Dec 23 2014

more info see: http://www.fairassociation.ca/the-independent-medical-examination-imeie/  and   http://www.fairassociation.ca/ime-providers-adverse-comments/


Comments are closed.

Allstate Insurance Company of Canada and Adel Harb https://www5.fsco.gov.on.ca/AD/5636

Allstate Insurance Company of Canada and Adel Harb https://www5.fsco.gov.on.ca/AD/5636
Decision Date: 2019-02-13Appeal, Final Decision, FSCO 5636

According to the Appellant, a “stand-alone” determination regarding catastrophic impairment in the absence of any dispute regarding accident benefits constituted a binding declaration of right, which fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal or the Superior Court.[3]

Further, the FSCO arbitrator’s jurisdiction derived solely from sections 279, 280 and 281 of the Insurance Act, and any power they have must be “… limited to dealing with those questions that must be answered in order to make a ruling on an applicant’s entitlement to benefits.”[4]  As the Courts have held that a designation of catastrophic impairment is not, in and of itself, an accident benefit, an arbitrator cannot determine the stand-alone issue of catastrophic impairment when no accident benefits are sought in the arbitration proceeding.

In his decision, the Arbitrator addressed these arguments. He acknowledged the determination of catastrophic impairment was not an accident benefit: “Reaching the status of catastrophic impairment does not itself determine entitlement to any specific benefit. It is only a gateway to entitlement to the highest tier of enhanced benefits under the Schedule.”[5]

Nonetheless, the Arbitrator held he was not persuaded that an arbitrator did not possess the jurisdiction to decide all disputes in respect of a person’s entitlement to accident benefits, or the amount of benefits to which the person is entitled. He found section 282(3) of the Insurance Actspecifically allowed an arbitrator to determine all issues in dispute, whether raised by the insured or the insurer.

The Arbitrator also noted that the Court of Appeal had recognized that within the realm of accident benefits, the courts do not have the sole jurisdiction to make a catastrophic determination. He was unconvinced a finding of catastrophic impairment was declaratory or equitable relief; it was a question that needed to be answered prior to determining whether a specified benefit was reasonable and necessary.

Once he made that determination, the Arbitrator went on to find the Respondent was indeed catastrophically impaired.
Decision Date: 2018-04-04 Arbitration, Final Decision, appeal pending, FSCO 5530

Mid-Hearing Motion #1

Upon closing his case and prior to the Insurer calling Dr. Sharma, an orthopaedic surgeon, the Applicant objected to the doctor taking the stand in order to testify.

The Applicant argues that the doctor did not assess the Applicant for a catastrophic impairment, but opined on the Applicant’s income replacement benefit (“IRB”) issue. This case is only about a catastrophic determination, under mental and behavioural issues. There is no relevance to Dr. Sharma’s testimony or in other words there is not a relationship with the doctor’s expertise and the issues in dispute. There is no probative value to his testimony, which may be prejudicial to the Applicant. The Applicant is unsure as to the intention of this witness’ testimony. Thus the evidence as it relates to the issue in dispute is unknown to the opposing party.

The Applicant argues that all non-relevant evidence should be excluded.

The Insurer argues that there is no prejudice in this instance and the fact that the Applicant does not know what the relevance of his evidence is, is not in itself prejudicial to the Applicant. The Applicant has the doctor’s reports and the diagnosis and the conclusions of the reports. The Insurer argues that the Applicant suffers from a constellation of symptoms, as has been already evidenced in this Hearing, according to the Guides[17]: chronic pain under Chapter 15, a closed head injury under Chapter 4, and not just the narrow issue of mental and behavioural issues under Chapter 14. Therefore the Insurer argues it has the right to bring this case to the attention of the trier of fact and present its case as it sees fit. The Insurer argues that the Applicant best fits Criterion 7 and not Criterion 8.

The Applicant replies that Dr. Sharma did not have any expertise in chronic pain. This is subjective and goes to the credibility of the Applicant which cannot be allowed as the doctor did not ask the correct questions to the Applicant directly.

The Insurer argues that Dr. Sharma is not being called for credibility issues alone, but he has tracked the Applicant’s physical condition, and the Insurer wants to argue this case on that basis. Further the Insurer suggests that it will not be asking for a whole person impairment (“WPI”) rating from the doctor, which has not been provided in the doctor’s report.


In the interest of fairness to the Insurer, I will allow the witness to testify to his reports and the implications of those reports on the Insurer’s perspective of this case. In my view, the Insurer also has the right to present its best evidence for its best defense. This of course does not have an impact on the Applicant’s ability to present his case as he ultimately has the burden of proof of entitlement.

Mid-Hearing Motion #2

During the examination of the Insurer’s expert, Dr. Sharma, counsel for the Insurer and Dr. Sharma recognized that his final report was not the report that the doctor had dictated or submitted to the service provider known as “CVE”.

The Insurer moved that I allow the correct version of the report in as evidence despite the late service.


The Insurer argued that under Rule 39.3 (c) of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code (the “Code”), I may allow the evidence due to extraordinary circumstances. This section reads as follows:

39.3 The hearing arbitrator will determine the relevance, materiality, and admissibility of evidence submitted at the hearing, but will not admit evidence at a hearing that:

(c) was not served on the opposing party in accordance with Rules 39.1 and 39.2, unless the hearing arbitrator is satisfied that extraordinary circumstances exist to justify an exception.

The Insurer argues that the only explanation it or Dr. Sharma can offer is that the third party service provider, who polishes the doctor’s formatted reports and submits them to the Insurer for dissemination, somehow and inexplicably changed vital sections of his report. Unfortunately, this has just been discovered and is out of the control of either party or the doctor. The doctor testified that he does not see the finished product prior to it being sent out to the parties. The doctor dictates the report, it is transcribed, and he then reviews it, makes any adjustments and then approves it for the proper formatting and the auto-signature to be applied. The doctor admitted it has not been his practice to review final reports in their final format in the past.

The Applicant argues that I should not allow the new report into evidence, for three reasons: first, the Code does not permit it, second, he has already objected to the doctor’s evidence, and third, it is not consistent with the principles of natural justice as he has been taken by surprise and/or ambushed. He is unable to properly cross-examine the witness. The Applicant has not been able to request the doctor’s notes and records in order to understand his evidence.

The Insurer’s remedy to the Applicant’s concerns of prejudice is to adjourn the Hearing, for two weeks, in order for the Applicant to read any documents he may want to review in order for him to properly cross-examine the doctor.


In my view, extraordinary circumstances are situations that appear as a surprise, and the surprise is out of the control of the parties. This is the case before me today. Essentially, CVE submitted a false report that negatively impacted on the Applicant, as the Insurer relied on this report in determining benefits the Applicant may have been entitled to, to one degree or another. This is verified by Insurer’s counsel. This issue was discovered on the day, just hours prior to the commencement of this proceeding and was reported immediately thereafter.

For the reasons above I adjourned the Hearing, after the doctor’s examination-in-chief had been completed, for two weeks, in order for the Applicant to properly prepare his cross-examination.


In regards to Dr. Sharma’s evidence that he believes that the underlying pain experienced by the Applicant can be attributed to his arthritis, I remain unconvinced that all of the Somatic Symptom Disorder, with predominant pain, persistent, as diagnosed by the Insurer’s own psychiatrist in June 2015,[50] is associated solely with the arthritis. There is no direct evidence to that effect. I also note that Dr. Sharma only makes a suggestion that a possible head trauma occurred and that this went unverified, therefore, in my view, means a Chapter 4 impairment rating and subsequent WPI rating are not necessary or required.


The Applicant argues that the special award is warranted on the following grounds:

1.      The Insurer refused to accept the CAT application based on Dr. Scott’s flawed report, as the evidence shows the doctor clearly did not follow the Guides recommendations;

2.      Mr. Landry’s OT report was not provided to Dr. Scott prior to the release of Dr. Scott’s CAT report, despite the critical role it should have played as part of a CAT determination team’s assessment of the Applicant;

3.      The Insurer relied upon a falsified or ghost written report of Dr. Sharma, which the Insurer had relied upon in making its decision not to accept the Applicant’s CAT application. As such the Insurer should be held vicariously liable for the conduct of a third party assessment firm it hired. The Applicant relies in part on the Supreme Court Decision in Bazley.[56]

In light of these facts the Applicant requests a finding of a 50% special award on benefits that the Applicant would have been entitled to from the date of the denial on November 2015 to date.

The Insurer argues, in part, that in respect of a special award, it does not believe that there are either grounds for or a jurisdictional basis upon which a special award can be granted. Further, the Insurer objects to the argument that it ought to be held responsible for the actions of CVE.Upon becoming aware of the error it communicated that fact to the Commission. It acted honourably and reasonably in all the circumstances. It is submitted that neither the error nor the report played a role in the determination of whether the Applicant had suffered acatastrophic impairment.


Comments are closed.

Applicant v. Intact Insurance Company, 2018 CanLII 130843 (ON LAT),

Applicant v. Intact Insurance Company, 2018 CanLII 130843 (ON LAT), <http://canlii.ca/t/hxfbv  

Has the Tribunal violated the rules of natural justice by imposing the terms on the IE?
11.      Intact raises several concerns with the order. Intact argues that the Tribunal’s terms allow [the applicant] “to control the process”, in that [the applicant] can refuse any compromise, thus forcing the IE to proceed by writing without [the applicant]’s attendance, which is unfair and places it at a serious disadvantage.[2] The 2nd Term – an IE by paper review – also undermines the Tribunal’s own finding at para 24, that “it would be unfair to [Intact] if it is not given the opportunity to assess whether the applicant has sustained a catastrophic impairment under Criteria 8, the central issue of the hearing”.
12.      In sum, it argues, “To force the respondent to proceed with IEs only by way of paper review would put the respondent at a significant disadvantage…”, and that disadvantage is a denial of natural justice.
13.      [The applicant] submits that the Tribunal’s terms are proper – the Tribunal properly balanced the parties’ rights and considerations and the remedies available under the Schedule. [The applicant] notes that other decisions have also called for a key IE to be conducted by paper review. [The applicant] notes that Intact has failed to produce a “scintilla of evidence” that an in person assessment is necessary and lists several practical options available for Intact to conduct a meaningful IE without an in person assessment. Finally, [the applicant] provided a “post-decision update” which was that he offered a reasonable compromise to attend a neuropsychological assessment with an attendant and other conditions.
14.      I agree with [the applicant]. Boiled down, Intact’s argument is that Intact’s failure to receive the IE in the manner it prefers is grounds for reversing or amending the Tribunal’s decision. Assuming for the moment that in some cases an Insurer’s failure to conduct an IE in the manner it prefers is grounds to amend a Tribunal decision, in this case, as [the applicant] submitted, the Tribunal was required to and properly preformed a “balancing act” and so the results of the balancing mean that Intact may not receive the IE that it prefers. In that light, Intact is essentially asking that I substitute my opinion for that of the Tribunal’s member that heard the parties’ written submissions, the testimony of [the applicant]’s treating psychologist about potential harm, and the parties arguments. I find that the Tribunal did not make an error and I decline to substitute my own ‘balancing’ determination for the Tribunal member that heard the evidence.
15.      As [the applicant] argues, the Tribunal faced a situation of diametrically opposed interests, and needed to balance those interests with a practical result. The Tribunal did so, appropriately considering the options contemplated under the Schedule with the possibility of an IE proceeding under s. 44(4). This is not a novel approach. Specifically, s. 44 of the Schedule allows for “paper reviews” as a means of conducting an IE. Similar results were reached in 16-003144 v. Cumis General Ins. Co. and 17-005291 v. Travelers Canada. To be clear, the result in this case is very fact specific to the evidence the Tribunal heard in this case. The Tribunal obviously considered the evidence of risk of harm in this case to be very significant, and accordingly imposed the terms that it did. Without a meaningful risk of harm, the appropriate range of terms, if any, would be different.
16.      There is also no evidence before me that a paper review in this matter is impossible or essentially meaningless. In fact, the opposite appears true, as Intact has conducted 13 IEs to date including several neuropsychological assessments. For that matter, Intact has minimally explained the disadvantage, particularly as one of its assessors concluded that [the applicant] provided invalid testing results. As noted above, [the applicant] offers several reasons why the disadvantage is illusory. Thus, Intact is not really presenting a breach of natural justice, as much as simply asking me to hear the same evidence and come to a different result.

Comments are closed.

18-000456 v Aviva Insurance Canada, 2018 CanLII 130867 (ON LAT),

18-000456 v Aviva Insurance Canada, 2018 CanLII 130867 (ON LAT), <http://canlii.ca/t/hxfcr

  [23]        Dr. Oshidari conducted the other IE and drafted a multidisciplinary report dated March 6, 2018. He found the applicant had reached maximal medical recovery from a physical standpoint in relation to the 2016 Accident related injuries. Dr. Oshidari found that the applicant’s recent weight gain was the cause of the back issues and nerve issues. He recommended an exercise program to address the applicant’s weight. In addition, Dr. Oshidari found that the applicant no longer had any impairment related to the 2016 Accident.   

[24]        I give little weight to Dr. Oshidari’s report as it relates to the applicant’s entitlement to a chronic pain Treatment Plan. Dr. Oshidari’s report was mostly a copy and paste of an earlier report on June 20, 2017. It was light on details and not well developed. For example, he notes that applicant has gained weight and puts in brackets “(not related to Accident)”. Dr. Oshidari does not explain why he believes the weight gain is not related to the applicant’s symptoms nor what information he relied on to reach that conclusion. Dr. Oshidari also suggested the applicant simply needs a gym membership to address his weight which would presumably address his ongoing pain symptoms. However, the applicant had already stated to Dr. Brown that he was unable to go to the gym as a result of his chronic pain caused by the 2016 Accident.

   [25]        I prefer the report of Dr. Brown which is more detailed, thorough and provides explanation for the findings made over the report of Dr. Oshidari.

Comments are closed.