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Sabadash v. State Farm et al., 2019 ONSC 1121 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/hxk3k
[11] Arbitrator Smith (“the Arbitrator”) granted Mr. Sabadash’s request for IRBs and other benefits. He held that, “I cannot accept State Farm’s submission that the ‘but for’ test endorsed by the Courts in accident negligence cases is to be applied to a determination of causation in the statutory accident benefit context.” He concluded that accident benefits were warranted because, “the preponderance of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the subject accident was a material significant factor well beyond the de minimis range in the causation of Mr. Sabadash’s inability to work…”
[12] A party to a FSCO arbitration may appeal an arbitrator’s order to the Director or his/her delegate, on a question of law. The Director or Director’s Delegate may confirm, vary, or rescind the arbitration order, or substitute his or her order for that of the arbitrator.
[13] State Farm appealed the Arbitrator’s decision to the Director’s Delegate of the FSCO on the basis that the test applied by the Arbitrator was the wrong one and that rather than using the material significant factor standard, he should have applied the “but for” test to determine causation.
[14] Director’s Delegate Evans allowed the appeal on the basis that the Arbitrator had misdirected himself as to the proper test of causation and should have applied the “but for” test. In so doing, the Director’s Delegate articulated what he believed to be the correct test and analysis to be applied. The Director’s Delegate ordered a new hearing before a different Arbitrator.
[45] The Applicant argues that the Arbitrator’s decision should be restored, as the Arbitrator’s analysis was the robust application of the “but for” test required by Clements. I disagree. The Director’s Delegate reasonably remitted the matter for rehearing so that the correct legal test for causation could be applied. He was correct in finding that the wrong test was articulated by the Arbitrator. However, although he identified the correct “but for” test, the Director’s Delegate did not correctly explain how the test works.
[46] As such, it is appropriate to remit the issue of causation to a different arbitrator to apply the correct test to the evidence. The Application for judicial review is dismissed.
Seetaram v. Allstate Insurance Company of Canada, 2019 ONSC 683 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/hx75m
[3] For the reasons I set out below, I declare that the Policy is void. I rely on s. 233(1)(a)(ii) of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. I.8 (“s. 233(1)(a)(ii)”) and Statutory Condition 1(1) of O. Reg. 777/93: Statutory Conditions – Automobile Insurance (the “Statutory Conditions”) which were breached when Zalimoon and Lakeram failed to disclose upon the renewal of the Policy that Avinash was a licensed driver in the household.
[96] The Applicants knew that Avinash was a licensed driver in their household with a G2 license that permitted him to drive on his own. The effect of such an additional driver on risk is clear – a high-risk driver in the household able to drive on his own would substantially affect the premium. Only the Applicants would have knowledge of that information, which put them in a position of the utmost good faith.
[97] Consequently, I do not grant order relief from forfeiture.Order and costs
[98] For the above reasons, I dismiss the application.[99] The matter was important to both parties. The motion records contained numerous affidavits, and cross-examination of the Applicants were required and appropriate. All parties prepared thorough factums and briefs of authorities. Based on the above factors, I fix costs at$15,000 (inclusive of taxes and disbursements), payable by the Applicants to Allstate within 30 days of this order.